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Introduction

1.1

Motivation

In a world with a large variety of products and hence feasible matches between buyers and products,
information can fundamentally a¤ect the match between buyers and products. A notable feature
of the digital economy is that sellers, or platforms and intermediaries that sellers use to place their
products, commonly have information about the value of the match between any speci…c product
and any speci…c buyer. In particular, by choosing how much information to disclose to the buyer
about the value of the match between buyer and product, a seller can a¤ect both the variety and
the prices of the products o¤ered.
We analyze the interaction between information and choice in a classic nonlinear pricing environment where the seller can o¤er a variety of products that are di¤erentiated by their quality. We
characterize the information structure and menu of choices that maximizes the expected pro…ts of
the seller.

The buyer has a continuum of possible types–her willingness to pay for the quality.

In the absence of any information design, the optimal menu o¤ers a continuum of qualities to the
buyer who then selects given her type as in Mussa and Rosen (1978). In this setting, we consider a
seller who can control the selling mechanism and the information structure, but cannot observe the
value or signal realization of the buyer. The selling mechanism could be any (possibly stochastic)
menu.
We derive the basic structure of the optimal information and mechanism (in Section 3). The
seller provides information in the form of a …nite and monotone partition and consequently o¤ers
the buyer a …nite menu (Theorem 1). The optimal menu is thus short relative to the menu with
a continuum of choices in the absence of information design. The …niteness of the information
structure has a straightforward intuition. Screening some open set of types requires maximizing the
virtual surplus. By construction, distortions in the qualities from the pro…t-maximizing qualities
will only cause second-order distortions to the total virtual surplus. But bundling a small interval
of types into a single expected type causes a …rst-order decrease in the information rents. Hence,
screening an open set of types is never optimal because pooling the types, and consequently the
allocation, causes a …rst-order reduction in the information rents and only second-order distortions
on pro…ts. Thus the optimal menu with information design is small relative to the (continuum)
menu in the absence of information design. But how small can the menu become?
We provide (weak) su¢ cient conditions on the cost function and value distribution under which
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a single-item menu is optimal (Theorem 2 in Section 4).

The marginal cost must be (weakly)

convex, and thus the cost function must be su¢ ciently convex and, in particular, more convex than
quadratic costs. The value distribution must satisfy a modest right tail condition: The modest right
tail condition holds if the buyer’s expected valuation conditional on being above some threshold
does not grow too fast in that threshold. The modest right tail condition is satis…ed if the density
is (i) uniform or linear, with any support; or, more generally, (ii) has a quasi-concave density which
is concave on its decreasing component. Under the conditions of Theorem 2, the single-item menu
may or may not involve some types being excluded, depending on the location of the support of
the values. If the lower end of the support is far from the upper end and close to zero, then the
single-item menu will lead to the exclusion of some types.
We report further results for the case where the cost function has a constant elasticity (in
Section 5).

These results o¤er insight into the structure of the optimal information and menu

more generally, and, in particular, o¤er insight into the su¢ cient conditions for a single-item menu
to be optimal as reported in Theorem 2.

First, we provide a necessary and su¢ cient condition

for the optimality of a single-item menu (in Proposition 10) depending only on the support of the
distribution and the elasticity of the cost function. In particular, a single-item menu is optimal if
the ratio of the upper bound of the support to the lower bound is less than the elasticity. Conversely,
if this condition fails, there exists a distribution with that support where a single-item menu is not
optimal.

Note that this tight distribution-free condition will necessarily fail as the lower bound

approaches zero, while the modest right tail condition assumed in Theorem 2 is easily satis…ed even
when the support includes 0. Second, we show that a single item menu will always be optimal for
high enough elasticity and will never be optimal for su¢ ciently low elasticity, i.e., approach unit
elasticity which corresponds to linear costs (Proposition 12). This explains why a lower bound on
convexity of costs is required in Theorem 2. Note that a quadratic cost function has elasticity 2, and
thus Theorem 2 requires a more convex cost than quadratic. Third, we establish that if we relax
our maintained …nite upper bound on values, the optimal menu is necessarily in…nite (Proposition
11).
We provide a complete analysis of a model with only two values in Section 5.
provides intuition for our general results.

This analysis

If the probability of a high-value buyer is too large

relative to that of a low-value buyer, then the low-value buyer is excluded altogether and a singleitem menu is optimal. This e¤ect is already present without information design. However, even
if the mass of low-value buyers is high enough, there will be no screening if the di¤erence between
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values is not large enough. The reason is that the high-value buyer gains information rents from the
quality provided to the low value buyer. These information rents are eliminated if the two types are
pooled. The bene…t of screening is that the high-value buyer receives the e¢ cient allocation. The
information rents grow linearly in the di¤erence between high and low value whereas the e¢ ciency
gains are convex in the di¤erence in values (for example, they are quadratic if the cost is quadratic).
Hence, when the di¤erence in values is too small, there will be pooling instead of screening. The
critical ratio between the high value and low value below which pooling is optimal is increasing
in the cost elasticity because the e¢ ciency gains increase slower than the information rents. Our
distribution-free result on the optimality of a single-item menu (Proposition 12) follows immediately
from this observation. Conversely, if the di¤erence between low and high values is large, there will
be screening without exclusion. It is the existence of a high value-low probability type that gives
rise to a failure of the modest right tail condition.

If there is no upper bound on values in the

general model (as in Proposition 11), the upper tail of the distribution plays the role of a high
value-low probability type.
The binary type model also informs us about some of the welfare implications that come with
the control of information. When the ratio of the high value to the low value is su¢ ciently large, the
standard nonlinear pricing solution is to screen and exclude the low value buyer from the market.
However, the optimal solution under information control is to pool the information and o¤er a single
item to the entire market. In either case, the buyers receive zero information rent but the pro…ts of
the seller increases, and thus so will the social welfare. Thus, the ability to manage the information
of the buyer can be social welfare increasing, but admittedly it is the seller who bene…ts rather than
the consumers.
The above results are obtained in the setting …rst proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) where
the product of willingness to pay and quality generate the gross utility of the buyer. In Section
6 we extend our analysis to general nonlinear utility functions of the buyer. Here we establish
that all our previous results carry over entirely as long as willingness to pay and quality permit a
multiplicative separable representation. We then further weaken the payo¤ environment to allow
for general monotone and supermodular payo¤ functions. The …nal result, Theorem 3, establishes
that the disclosure of any open set remains a suboptimal information policy. Theorem 3 thus generalizes Theorem 1, but with weaker implications. In particular, we show by means of two examples
that a monotone partition is not always an optimal information structure under supermodularity
conditions alone.
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Our setting re‡ects three notable features of the digital economy. We already mentioned the
fact that the sellers are well-informed about buyers’ values. Our analysis considers the extreme
case where the buyer only knows the prior and the seller has access to all feasible signals. A second
notable feature is that the buyers have the ability to …nd which items are available at what price,
due to search engines and price comparison sites. Thus, personalized prices (or more generally
third-degree price discrimination) are not available, but menu pricing (or more generally seconddegree price discrimination) can occur. Finally, particular items, that is quality-price pairs, are
recommended to di¤erent buyers via recommendation and ranking services.
Our leading interpretation is that the seller can in‡uence the information that the buyer has
about his value but does not observe that value. Although we will not pursue it formally in the
paper, an alternative interpretation of our model is that the seller does in fact observe the buyer’s
value but is unable, for regulatory or business model reasons, to o¤er prices for item that depend
on the buyer’s value. Thus, the seller cannot engage in perfect price discrimination (or third-degree
price discrimination). In fact, the seller is constrained to o¤er a common menu of items. However,
as long as all buyers are o¤ered the same menu, he is allowed to credibly convey information
about buyers’ values.

Now the implementation of the optimal information structure and selling

mechanism is that the seller posts a menu and sends a signal to the buyer that recommends one
item on the menu. The resulting recommendation policy is one which we commonly observe on
e-commerce platforms. Namely, the seller does not engage in third-degree price discrimination, but
rather, among the range of possible choices, every buyer is steered to a speci…c alternative at a price
that is common to all consumers. This implementation makes sense in our model if we impose the
interim obedience constraint that recommendations are optimal for the buyer conditional on the
recommendation received.
Consistent with this interpretation, eBay personalizes the search results for each buyer through
a machine learning algorithm and determines a personalized default order of search results in a
process referred to as "Best Match," see eBay (2022). DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) provide
strong evidence that large chains price uniformly across stores despite wide variation in consumer
demographics and competition. Further, Cavallo (2017), (2019) documents that online and o- ine
prices are identical or very similar for large multi-channel retailers, thus con…rming the adherence to
a uniform price policy. Related, Amazon apologized publicly to its customers when a price testing
program o¤ered the same product at di¤erent prices to di¤erent consumers, and committed to never
"price on consumer demographics," see Weiss (2000).
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Related Literature

We consider a model of nonlinear pricing as …rst analyzed in Mussa and Rosen (1978). Similar to
Mussa and Rosen (1978), we focus on o¤ering a menu of di¤erent qualities which can be produced
at an increasing and convex cost. Our analysis could similarly be applied to the setting of quantity
di¤erentiation as in the model of Maskin and Riley (1984) with constant marginal costs (as we will
discuss in Section 6).
In our analysis, the seller can control the information and the mechanism. It therefore combines
Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) or information design more generally with
mechanism design tools. We thus o¤er a solution to an integrated mechanism and information
design problem in a classic economic environment. Perhaps surprisingly given the proximity of the
tools as highlighted in the recent work by Kleiner, Moldovanu, and Strack (2021), we are not aware
of any related work in optimal pricing that combines mechanism and information design.

The

closest work in this sense is Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), who consider a seller with many
unit-demand buyers. There the seller can both choose the selling mechanism and the information
each buyer receives about their own value. Their main result, showing that sellers have each buyer
observe a …nite and monotone partition about their value, relates to the current result. Because
unit demand allocation is a linear problem, they are able to establish the optimality of a coarse
partition by construction.

Our nonlinear pricing analysis has to determine not only whether to

assign the object, but also at what level of quality. Thus, the current results on the cardinality of the
menu and the su¢ cient condition for a single-item menu do not have a counterpart in Bergemann
and Pesendorfer (2007). Brooks and Du (2021), like Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), consider a
many-player, single-unit setting where both the selling mechanism and the buyers’information are
endogenous in some sense. However, there the seller is choosing the mechanism to maximize revenue
under the worst-case information structure, so it is as if an adversary picks the information structure.
Thus, the seller does not jointly design the information structure and selling mechanisms.
Our analysis is an instance of second-degree price discrimination. But the seller also creates
segments (or pools) within the market. In doing so, he makes items intended for other segments
less attractive to each buyer. In this sense, the seller is inducing partial third-degree price discrimination.

By contrast, Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015) and Haghpanah and Siegel (2022)

explicitly allow full third-degree price discrimination, while also allowing discrimination within
each segment by o¤ering quality-di¤erentiated products. Roesler and Szentes (2017) consider the
buyer-optimal information structure with single-unit demand. Thus, the demand structure and the
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objective di¤er from the current work, but they share the focus on creating segmentations with a
single aggregate market. Anderson and Dana (2009) ask when second-degree price discrimination
is pro…table in an environment where there is a priori a …nite upper bound on the quality provided.
They provide conditions under which all types receive the same quality, namely the quality at the
upper bound. The condition can be stated in terms of log submodular versus log supermodular
preferences. By contrast, our environment is log supermodular everywhere, and hence there is no
reason to restrict the menu and o¤er a bunching solution in the sense of Anderson and Dana (2009).
Another explanation for pooling is that the distribution of values is "irregular" in the sense of
Myerson (1981). This would imply an interval over which buyers with di¤erent values were o¤ered
the same quality, as established already in Mussa and Rosen (1978).
Loertscher and Muir (2022) consider a seller who o¤ers …xed quantities of products of di¤erent
qualities. They show that bundling di¤erent qualities, or randomizing the quality assignment via
lotteries, can increase the revenue in the presence of irregular type distributions. Our results hold
for regular distributions as well as irregular ones.
Rayo (2013) considers a model of social status provision that shares some features with our
model. The utility function of the agent before any transfer is a product of his type (or an increasing
function of his type) and a social status which is equal to his expected type given some information
structure. Rayo (2013) then asks what is the optimal information structure to provide to the
agent by a revenue maximizing monopolist. Thus, the allocation in Rayo (2013) is an information
structure rather than a quality allocation. In consequence, the allocations all have the same constant
cost, namely zero. In addition, the information structure only a¤ects the allocation and not the
expectation of the buyer regarding his own type. The main result, Theorem 1, is that the optimal
information structure–he restricts attention to deterministic information structures–has an interval
structure.
In Rayo (2013) and Loertscher and Muir (2022), distinct products are pooled and the buyer is
o¤ered a correspondingly smaller choice set. In our model, the optimal information design pools the
types of the buyers and creates coarse information for the buyers. In turn, the coarse information
leads to an optimally short menu of choices. While the prediction of the optimal nonlinear pricing
problem is a continuum of choices–thus a very long menu–in many real-world application, the
cardinality of the menus is …nite and the menu is often very short.
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Model

A seller supplies goods of varying quality q 2 R+ to a buyer. The buyer has a willingness-to-pay
(or value or type) v 2 R+ for quality q 2 R+ . The utility net of the payment p 2 R+ is:
u(v; q; p) = vq
The value v 2 R+ is distributed according to F 2

(1)

p:
([v; v]); with support 0

v < v < 1, with

strictly positive and non-vanishing density, except possibly at the upper bound (i.e., F 0 (v) > 0 for
all v < v). The seller’s cost of providing quality q is c(q), where c : R+ ! R+ is assumed to be a
(weakly) increasing and (weakly) convex function.

The seller can choose the information the buyer has about their value and a menu of qualities
and corresponding prices.
First, the seller chooses a signal (or information structure) s : R+ !

R+ , where s(v) is a signal

realization observed by the buyer when the value is v: The buyer’s expected value conditional on
the signal realization s is denoted by:
w , E[v j s]:

(2)

Since the utility is linear in v, w is a su¢ cient statistic for determining the buyer’s preferences
when they observe signal s. We denote by G the distribution of expected values; supp(G) is the
support of G. We refer to s, or more directly the induced distribution G of expected values, as the
information structure. Second, the seller chooses a menu (or direct mechanism) with qualities q (w)
at prices p (w) :
M , f(q(w); p(w))gw2suppG
where the mechanism has to satisfy incentive compatibility and participation constraints. Thus for
all w; w0 2 supp(G) :
wq(w)

p(w)

wq(w0 )

wq(w)

p(w)

0:

p(w0 );

(3)
(4)

We refer to a mechanism as a pair (G; M ) of information structure G and menu M . The seller’s
problem is to maximize expected pro…ts, revenues minus cost:
,

max

s:R! (S)
(q(w);p(w))

E[p(w)

c(q(w))]:
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The expected social surplus and the buyer’s surplus are denoted by S and U , respectively:
S , E[q(w)w

c(q(w))];

U , E[q(w)w

(5)

p(w)]:

We note that the direct mechanism M could also be expressed in terms of a simple indirect menu
where the seller chooses (Q; p) consisting of a set of qualities Q

R+ and a pricing rule p : Q ! R+ .

Then the information structure can be expressed as a recommendation rule s : R+ !

3

Q.

Structure of the Optimal Mechanism

We now provide a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism for the general environment
with a continuum of values. The main qualitative feature is that the optimal information structure
partitions values into intervals. Subsequently, the buyer only learns to which element of the partition
their realized value belongs.

3.1

Finite and Monotone Partition

We say that the information structure G has interval structure if there exists some countable
collection of intervals f[xi ; xi ) j i 2 Ig, such that:
8
<F 1 (q);
if q 2
6 [i2I [xi ; xi );
1
G (q) = R xi F 1 (t)dt
: xi
; if q 2 [xi ; xi ):
xi x

(6)

i

We de…ne the intervals in the quantile space rather than the value space. In other words, G
has interval structure if it can be constructed from partitioning the space of quantiles and the
associated values into intervals–possibly countably in…nite. There is either complete disclosure and
q 62 [i2I [xi ; xi ), and then the buyer learns the value; or there is pooling and q 2 [xi ; xi ), and the

buyer only learns that their value (and quantile) is somewhere in the interval q 2 [xi ; xi ). We say

that G has a …nite pooling interval structure if G has interval structure, I is …nite and there is no
interval of full disclosure, that is, xi = xi+1 for all i.
Our …rst main result establishes that the optimal information structure is a …nite pooling interval
structure. Here we have to add a qualifying remark. To the extent that some values may not receive

a positive quality in the optimal mechanism, there may be some multiplicity in the information
structure. For example, values which do not receive the good (they obtain quality zero) may or may
not be pooled. But it is without loss of generality for the optimal revenue to always pool all values
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that receive zero quality. Hence, we consider mechanisms (G; M ) such that, if q(w) = q(w0 ) = 0 for
any pair w; w0 2 supp(G), then w = w0 . In other words, all values who are not served a positive
quality are pooled in the same partition. Of course, this will not change the nature of the optimal

mechanism beyond disciplining the information provided to values who do not buy a positive quality.
Theorem 1 (Structure of the Optimal Mechanism)
In every optimal mechanism the information structure is a …nite pooling interval structure and the
optimal quality q (w) is increasing in w on the support of G.
This …rst main result therefore establishes that every optimal mechanism consists of a …nite
pooling information structure. In consequence, the optimal menu will contain only a …nite number
of items; it is a short menu. This contrasts with a long menu with a continuum of items which
would be optimal in the absence of a choice regarding the information structure.
Corollary 1 (Finite Support)
The optimal information structure has …nite support and the optimal menu o¤ers a …nite number
of qualities.
We will prove Theorem 1 in several steps. In the …rst step we write the payment p as a function
of the qualities q by applying the envelope theorem to the buyer’s utility maximization problem
(for example, as in Myerson (1981)).
The second step shows that there exists an optimal mechanism in which the optimal information
structure has interval structure. This step will be proven by showing that, given a menu of qualities
and prices, the seller’s maximization problem is linear in the quantile function of the expected
values. Hence, we can use recent results in Kleiner, Moldovanu, and Strack (2021) to characterize
the optimal information structure in terms of the extreme points of the set of quantile functions
that are a mean-preserving spread of the quantile function of values. We then proceed to show that
in every optimal mechanism the information structure has interval structure. This follows from
the fact that the policy and the information structure must be jointly designed. If the information
structure does not have an interval structure, it is possible to write it as a linear combination of
interval information structures, and each of one of these would have to be optimal. However, a
given vector q cannot be optimal for more than one …nite pooling information structure.
The third step shows that there is no interval of complete disclosure. This is the crucial step
where we compute the trade-o¤ between information rents and e¢ ciency. We show that for small
enough intervals, pooling information and allocation always increases the seller’s pro…ts.
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The third step proves that the number of qualities o¤ered is discrete, but leaves open the
possibility that it is countably in…nite. We then proceed in two additional steps to prove that the
optimal mechanism is indeed …nite. However, the crucial step in which we compute the trade-o¤
between informational rents and e¢ ciency is the aforementioned third step.

3.2

Restating the Seller’s Problem

Before we can apply the envelope theorem as in the classic mechanism design literature, we need
to address the following challenge. The distribution of expected values may not be absolutely
continuous, so the resulting set of items of varying quality does not completely determine the
incentive compatible payments. We therefore extend the assignment of qualities to cover the entire
value space, [v; v], the support of the distribution F .
Lemma 1 (Extension of Policies)
For all individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms (q(w); p(w)) de…ned on supp(G),
there exists a mechanism (^
q (w); p^(w)) that is incentive compatible and individually rational for all
w 2 supp(F ) with q^(w) = q(w) and p^(w) = p(w) for all w 2 supp(G).
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove this lemma it is enough to consider the following mechanism.
For every w 62 supp(G) we de…ne:
(^
q (w); p^(w)) ,

arg max

fqw

pg:

(q;p)2f(q(w);p(w)g[f(0;0)g

Clearly, incentive compatibility and individual rationality will be satis…ed. Hence, we assume that
q is de…ned for all w 2 supp(F ) (rather than supp(G)).

We now provide the classic construction of the buyer’s surplus U , de…ned earlier in (5) in terms

of the qualities provided.
Lemma 2 (Buyer’s Surplus)
In every incentive compatible mechanism (G; M ), the buyer’s surplus is:
U=

Z

v

q(w)(1

G(w))dw:

v

This is the standard representation of the buyer’s surplus, see Myerson (1981). As the seller’s
pro…ts are equal to total surplus minus the buyer’s surplus, we can write the pro…ts in an incentive
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compatible mechanism as follows:
Z v
=
(wq(w)

12

c(q(w))) dG(w)

v

Z

v

q(w)(1

(7)

G(w))dw;

v

which depends only on q (and not p).
The distribution G of expected values is generated by the prior distribution F and a signal s.
By Blackwell (1951), Theorem 5, there exists a signal s that induces a distribution G of expected
values if and only if F is a mean-preserving spread of G. F is de…ned to be a mean-preserving
spread of G if

Z

1

Z

F (t)dt

1

v

v

G(t)dt, 8v 2 R+ ;

with equality for v = 0: If F is a mean-preserving spread of G we write F
use the fact that the distribution function F

G if and only if G

1

G. We will frequently
F

1

(see Shaked and

Shanthikumar (2007), Chapter 3).
Hence, the seller’s problem can be restated in terms of G and q:
Z v
Z v
max
(wq(w) c(q(w))) dG(w)
q(w)(1 G(w))dw ;
G;q

v

(8)

v

subject to q being non-decreasing and F

G:

We denote by (G ; q ) a solution to this problem.

3.3

Interval Structure

We now reformulate the seller’s problem in a way that it is linear in G 1 . For any mechanism (G; q)
we can construct a random variable t uniformly distributed in the unit interval such that:
w = G 1 (t):
If G is continuously distributed, then t = G 1 (w), otherwise, t is constructed introducing randomizations at every point of discontinuity of G. Similarly, we can write the quality q in terms of t,
which we denote by:
qt (t) , q(G 1 (t)):

(9)

Hence, we can describe the mechanism as (G; qt ).
We can write (7) as follows:
Z 1
=
G 1 (t)qt (t)dt
0

Z

0

1

c(qt (t))dt

Z

0

1

qt (t)(1

t)dG 1 (t):
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Integrating by parts the last term:
Z
= G 1 (t)(1

t)dqt (t)

Z

c(qt (t))dt:

Note that qt (t) is non-decreasing, so dqt corresponds to the integral using qt as a measure.
We can now …x an optimal mechanism (G ; q ). The optimal information structure must satisfy:
Z
Z 1
1
G (t)(1 t)dqt (t)
c(qt (t))dt:
(10)
= arg max
fG

1 :G 1

F

1g

0

Note that if we change the information structure, but keep qt constant, the expected production
R
cost c(qt (t))dt will not change.
The optimization problem (10) is an upper semi-continuous linear functional of G 1 . The upper

semi-continuity can be veri…ed by noting that every G 1 F 1 is upper semi-continuous. Hence,
^ 1 ! G 1 (taking the limit using the L1 norm), we have that lim sup G
^ 1 (t)
if G
G(t) for all
R1
R1
1
1
^ (t)(1 t)dq (t)
G (t)(1 t)dqt (t).
t 2 [0; 1]. Hence, lim sup 0 G
t
0
Proposition 1 in Kleiner, Moldovanu, and Strack (2021) shows that the set fG

1

:G

1

F

1

g

is a convex and compact set, and Theorem 1 shows that the extreme points of this set are given by
(6). Following Bauer’s maximum principle, the maximization problem attains its maximum at an
extreme point of fG

1

:G

1

F

1

g and we can conclude:

Proposition 1
There exists an optimal mechanism (G ; q ) such that G has interval structure.
We now prove that an optimal mechanism must have an interval structure. Suppose that there
exists an optimal mechanism (G ; q ) such that G does not have interval structure. Then there
exists a collection of interval information structures G and a measure
distributions such that:
G

1

=

Z

over these interval structure

G 1 d (G 1 ):

Furthermore, since the functional (10) is linear in G 1 , each of these interval information structures
must be optimal. Hence, there must exist two optimal mechanisms (G1 ; q ) and (G2 ; q ), with
G1 ; G2 having interval structure and G1 (w) 6= G2 (w) for some w. However, G1 and G2 must have
di¤erent supports, which we now show to be inconsistent with it being an optimal mechanism.
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Lemma 3 (G and q are Increasing in the Support)
Let (G ; q ) be an optimal mechanism with q (w) = 0 if and only if w
in some interval (w1 ; w2 ) with w^
Proof of Lemma 3.

w.
^ Then, G is constant

w1 if and only if q is constant in (w1 ; w2 ).

We …rst prove su¢ ciency. Suppose that in some interval (w1 ; w2 ),

q is constant but G is not constant in this interval (G (w1 ) < G (w2 )). Consider the following
information structure:
8
>
maxfG (w)
>
>
<
~
G(w)
= G (w2 );
>
>
>
:G (w);

where " is chosen such that:

Z

w2

~
G(w)dw
=

0

"; 0g; if w 2 (0; w1 ];
if w 2 (w1 ; w2 ];
if w > w2 ;
Z

w2

G (w)dw:

0

~ is a mean-preserving contraction of G ). ConHence, this is a feasible information structure (G
~ …rst order stochastically dominates G : for all w
ditional on w
w1 ; the distribution G
w1 ,
~
G(w)
G (w). Conditional on w
w2 ; both distributions are the same. Since q is constant in
(w1 ; w2 ), this clearly generates higher pro…ts when q (w1 ) 6= 0.

We now prove necessity. Suppose that in some interval (w1 ; w2 ), q is not constant (q (w1 ) <

q (w2 )) but G is constant in this interval. We can then consider the following variation:
8
<q (v)
if w 62 (w1 ; w2 );
q~(w) =
:q (w ) if w 2 (w ; w ):
1

1

2

We then have that (G ; q~) generates the same total surplus but generates less bidder surplus.
Hence, following Lemma 3 there can only be one optimal …nite pooling interval information

structure. We thus conclude that there cannot be an optimal mechanism without a …nite pooling
interval structure, as this would require that there would be multiple optimal …nite pooling interval
structures. Thus we can conclude:
Proposition 2 (Necessity of Interval Structure)
In every optimal mechanism (G ; q ), the information structure G has interval structure.
The proposition leaves open the possibility that there are intervals of complete disclosure.
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Optimality of Pooling

We next show that every interval is a pooling interval, and then in a second step that the number
of intervals is …nite. We …rst provide an intuition and then provide the proof.
Suppose the seller pools the allocation of all values in interval [v1 ; v2 ], so that they all get the
average quality in this interval: how much lower would the pro…ts be? To make the notation more
compact, we denote the virtual values by:
(v) , v

1

F (v)
:
f (v)

(11)

The revenue generated is the expectation of the product of the virtual values and the qualities:
Z v
q (v) (v)f (v)dv:
R,
v

We denote the mean and variance of the quality and virtual values in this interval by:
R v2
R v2
(v)f
(v)dv
q (v)f (v)dv
v1
R v2
, v1R v2
;
;
q ,
f (v)dv
f (v)dv
v1
v1
R v2
R v2
2
(q (v)
( (v)
)2 f (v)dv
q ) f (v)dv
v1
v1
2
2
R
R
,
;
:
v2
v2
q ,
f (v)dv
f (v)dv
v1
v1

(12)
(13)

The …rst step of the proof consists of showing that the revenue losses due to pooling the allocation
in the interval [v1 ; v2 ] are bounded by:
q (F (v2 )

F (v1 )):

The total cost will also (weakly) decrease if the allocation is pooled because the cost function is
convex. Hence, pooling the allocation generates third-order pro…t losses when the interval is small
(since each of the terms multiplied are small when the interval is small).
If in addition to pooling the allocation we pool the information of the values in this interval, we can reduce the buyer’s information rent. When only the allocation is pooled–but not the
information–then the quality increase that the pool gets relative to values just below the pool is the
quality di¤erence

q

q (v1 ) priced at v1 . After pooling the information, the price of the quality

increase is computed using the expected value conditional on being in this interval:
v

, E[v j v 2 [v1 ; v2 ]]
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Hence, pooling the information increases the transfers for every value higher than v2 by an amount:
(E[v j v 2 [v1 ; v2 ]]

v1 )(

q

q (v1 ))(1

F (v1 )):

Here the …rst two terms being multiplied are small when the interval is small. However, transfers
are marginally increased for all values higher than v2 , which is a non-negligible mass of values
(i.e., (1

F (v1 )) is not small). In other words, pooling information increases the price of the

quality increase (

q

q (v1 )) for all values higher than v2 . Hence, pooling information generates a

second-order bene…t which always dominates the third-order distortions.
Proposition 3 (Pooling Intervals)
The optimal information structure consists of pooling intervals only.
Proof of Proposition 3. Following Proposition 1, the optimal information structure consists
of intervals of pooling and intervals of full disclosure. We consider an optimal mechanism and an
interval (v1 ; v2 ) such that the optimal information structure is full disclosure in this interval (i.e.,
such that G (v) = F (v)). We expose a contradiction by proving that there is an improvement. It
is useful to write the interval (v1 ; v2 ) in terms of its mean and di¤erence:
v^ ,
So, we have that (v1 ; v2 ) = (^
v

v1 + v2
;
2

; v^ +

,

v2

v1
2

:

) and we will eventually take the limit

! 0.

Following Lemma 3, the qualities q (v) must be strictly increasing in this interval. We consider
qualities:
q~(v) =

8
<

q

:q (v)

if v 2 (v1 ; v2 )
if v 62 (v1 ; v2 )

The di¤erence between the optimal policy and the variation is given by:
Z v2
~ =
( (v)q (v) c(q (v))) f (v)dv (F (v2 ) F (v1 ))

q

c( q ) :

(14)

v1

Note that we only need to consider the qualities in the interval [v1 ; v2 ] to compute the di¤erence.
We can write this expression more conveniently as follows:
Z v2
Z
~ =
( (v)
)(q (v)
q )f (v)dv
v1

v2

v1

c(q (v))

c( q ) f (v)dv:
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is smaller than under q because the cost is convex, so the

second integral is positive (which is being subtracted). Furthermore, using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, we can bound the …rst integral (and thus the whole expression) as follows:
~

(F (v2 )

q

(15)

F (v1 )):

Finally, using the Bhatia-Davis inequality, we can bound the variances as follows:
q
( q q (v1 ))(q (v2 )
q
q );
and similarly for : We can then conclude that:
~
lim

3

!0

dq (^
v ) d (^
v)
f (^
v ):
dv
dv
3

We thus have that the e¢ ciency losses are of order
We now consider the following policy:
8
>
q (v1 );
>
>
<
q^(v) =
q;
>
>
>
:q (v);

Note that here

v

(16)

.

if v 2 (v1 ;

v );

(17)

if v 2 [ v ; v2 );
if v 62 (v1 ; v2 ):

is the mean value in the interval [v1 ; v2 ]. We additionally change the information

structure so that all types in (v1 ; v2 ) are pooled. That is, the information structure is:
8
>
F (v1 ); if v 2 (v1 ; v );
>
>
<
^
G(v)
= F (v2 ); if v 2 [ v ; v2 );
>
>
>
:F (v);
if v 62 [v ; v ):
1

(18)

2

^ q^) and by (G; q~) is the same. Then, the di¤erence
Observe that the total surplus generated by (G;
in the generated pro…ts is equal to the di¤erence in the expected buyer’s surplus:
^

~ =(

We conclude that:

^
lim

!0

Here we used that (
that for

q (v1 ))(

q

v

v1 )= !1, as

v

v1 )(1

F (v1 )):

~

2

dq (^
v)
(1 F (v1 )):
dv
! 0: The e¢ ciency losses are of order

small enough, the new policy generates higher pro…ts.

(19)
2

. We conclude
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Given the optimality of pooling intervals we introduce the following notation. The distribution
function G associated with any pooling interval structure is an increasing and piecewise constant
step function G given by:
Gk , G(wk );

gk , G(wk )

(20)

G(wk 1 ):

Moreover, given the pooled interval structure, we can relate the probability of each interval to the
underlying distribution of values, thus
gk = F (vk )

F (vk 1 ) ; wk 2 [vk 1 ; vk ] .

Finally, the quality (and increment) allocated to value wk is denoted by
qk , q(wk );

qk , qk

(21)

qk 1 :

In a …nite-item menu, the pro…ts are given by:
=

K
X

gk (wk qk

c(qk ))

k=1

K
X

(wk+1

wk )qk (1

Gk );

(22)

k=1

where by convention wK+1 , wK . This is the discrete counterpart of (7). We can also express the
pro…ts as follows:
=

K
X

wk qk (1

Gk 1 )

gk c(qk );

(23)

k=1

where G0 = 0:

3.5

Menu Convexity

Before we can prove the …niteness of the menu, we establish a qualitative property of the menu
that will support an argument for …niteness. Namely, we show that the menu will have increasing
quality increments, thus
qk+1 = qk+1

qk

qk

qk

1

=

qk ;

for all k, whether k is …nite or not.
Lemma 4 (Increasing Di¤erences in Qualities)
In any optimal mechanism the quality increments

qk must be (weakly) increasing in k:
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We …x a mechanism (G; q) and assume that there exists k~ such that

Proof of Lemma 4.

qk+1
~ . We prove that the mechanism cannot be optimal.
~ q~) that keeps the qualities the same:
We consider an alternative mechanism (G;

qk~ >

q~k = qk ; for all k 2 f1; :::; Kg:
~ k~ + 1g, the
The alternative information structure is de…ned as follows. First, for all k 62 fk;

probabilities and expected values remain the same: w~k = wk and g~k = gk : We modify the information
structure as follows:
= gk+1
g~k~ = gk~ + "; g~k+1
~
~

";

w~k~ =

gk~ wk~ + "wk+1
~
; w~k+1
= wk+1
~
~ :
gk~ + "

Note that:
g~k~ w~k~ + g~k+1
~k+1
= gk~ wk~ + gk+1
~ w
~
~ wk+1
~ ;
so this is clearly a mean-preserving contraction of G, and thus it is clearly feasible. The new
information structure will not be a partition, but for the purpose of the proof this is irrelevant
because we will prove that the stated mechanism is suboptimal. To keep the expressions more
compact, it is useful to introduce the following notation:
wk~
w~
, w~k~ wk~ = " k+1
:
gk~ + "
Note that when "

0,

wk~ )=gk~ .

"(wk+1
~

The di¤erence in the pro…ts generated by the original mechanism and the new mechanism are
given by:
e =w~ q~ (1
k
k
(gk~

=

Gk~ 1 ) + wk+1
qk+1
~
~ (1
g~k~ )c(qk~ )

(gk+1
~

Gk~ )

Gk~ 1 ) qk~ + wk+1
qk+1
~
~ " + "c(qk
~)

(1

Gk~ 1 ) qk~ + wk+1
qk+1
~
~ "
(1

~ ~ ) + w~k+1 q~ (1
G
k 1
k+1

Gk~ 1 )

"c(qk+1
~ )

"c0 (qk~ ) qk+1
~

"c0 (qk~ )

The …rst inequality follows from the fact that c is convex, so c(qk~ ) c(qk+1
~ )

c0 (qk~ ) qk+1
~ ; the second

inequality follows from the fact that we are assuming (to reach a contradiction) that
Taking the derivative and evaluating at 0, we get:
d(
d"

e)

<
"=0

qk+1
~
gk~

~ ~)
G
k

g~k+1
~ )c(qk+1
~ )

(1

< qk+1
wk+1
~
~ "

w~k~ qk~ (1

(wk+1
~

wk~ )(1

Gk~ 1 ) + gk~ wk+1
~

gk~ c0 (qk~ ) :

qk+1
~

qk~ .
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The quality provided to expected valuation wk satis…es the following …rst-order condition:
wk

c0 (qk ) = (wk+1

wk )

1

Gk
gk

:

Using this …rst-order condition we have that:
d(
d"

e)

<
"=0

qk+1
~
gk~

+ (wk+1
Gk~ 1 ) + gk~ wk+1
~
~

wk~ )(1

(wk+1
~

wk~ )(1

Gk~ )

gk~ wk~ )

= 0:

Hence, (G; q) is not optimal.

3.6

Optimality of Short Menu

We now show that the optimal information structure consists of …nitely many intervals.
Proposition 4 (Finite Pooling Interval)
The optimal information structure has a …nite pooling interval structure.
Proof of Proposition 4. Since the space of values is compact, this is equivalent to showing
that there are no accumulation points of intervals. We consider three consecutive pooling intervals
that generate expected values wk

1

< wk < wk+1 .

Lemma 4 implies that there cannot be any accumulation points, except possibly at some v^
satisfying q (^
v ) = 0. Hence, it is a decreasing accumulation point (that is, the limit of expected
valuations converges to v^ from the right). We denote by f and f the maximum and minimum
density in [v; (v + v^)=2]:
f,

min

(v+^
v)
v2[v; 2 ]

F 0 (v);

f,

max

(v+^
v)
v2[v; 2 ]

F 0 (v):

If such an accumulation point exists, we can …nd two consecutive pooling intervals, (vk 1 ; vk ] and
(vk ; vk+1 ], generating expected values wk < wk+1 , satisfying gk < gk+1 , and:
p
f (1 F (vk 1 ))
0
0
c (qk+1 ) c (qk ) < p p
p :
f( f + f)

Note that the qualities qk are monotonic, and so we must have that (qk+1

(24)
qk ) converge to 0 as

we take intervals close enough to v^. So, we can take intervals close enough to v^ such that (24) is
satis…ed. Hence, we consider two intervals satisfying this inequality and reach a contradiction. We
recall that the density is not vanishing except at the upper bound v, so we must have that f > 0:
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Analogous to (11), we de…ne:
k

, wk

(wk+1

wk )

1

Gk
gk

;

and extend (12)-(13) in the natural way:
w

,

and analogously for

gk wk + gk+1 wk+1
;
gk + gk+1
q;

q;

2
w

,

+ gk+1 (wk+1
gk + gk+1

2
w)

. Finally, ^ and ~ are de…ned in the same way as before.

;

Following the same steps as before, we have that:
q
( q q (wk ))(q (wk+1 )
~
^

2
w)

gk (wk

~

(

q

q (wk ))(

q
)
(
q
w

k )( k+1

wk )(1

)(gk + gk+1 )
:

F (vk 1 ))

We note that:

gk+1 ( k+1
gk ( k+1
k)
k)
;
=
;
k+1
gk + gk+1
gk + gk+1
and the di¤erence between other quantities can be written in an analogous way. We thus get that:
~
gk ( k+1
k )(gk + gk+1 )
:
^ ~
gk+1 (wk+1 wk )(1 F (vk 1 ))
k

=

We then note that:
gk + gk+1

f (vk+1

vk 1 );

wk

p
p
f vk + f vk
p
p
f+ f

1

;

wk+1

p
p
f vk + f vk+1
p
:
p
f+ f

We also recall that gk < gk+1 and note that the optimal quality is given by
k+1

= c0 (qk+1 ). We thus get that:
~
^

~

k

= c0 (qk ) and

p
p
p
f (c0 (qk+1 ) c0 (qk ))( f + f )
p
< 1;
f (1 F (vk 1 ))

where the second inequality corresponds to (24). Thus, we reach a contradiction with this being an
optimal mechanism.

4

Single-item Menu

So far, we have shown that the optimal mechanism generates a coarse menu that only o¤ers a …nite
number of items. By contrast, with complete disclosure of information to the buyer, the optimal
menu would typically o¤er a continuum of items. This leaves open the question of how coarse the
menu can become. In this section, we introduce su¢ cient conditions that will guarantee that the
optimal menu consists of a single item.
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The Optimal Single-item Menu

Suppose that the seller were constrained to only o¤er a single item. Which item would he then o¤er
and at what price? The optimal single-item menu is found by solving the following problem:
(q ; v ) 2 arg max P[v 0

v](E[v 0 j v 0

q;v

We denote by

v]q

(25)

c(q)):

the expectation of v conditional on v exceeding v :
, E[v 0 j v 0

v ]:

The single-item mechanism consists of selling quality q at a price p =

q , which is sold to all

values higher than v . The buyer is only informed whether he should buy the good. Note that the
buyer is left with no surplus.
The …rst-order conditions for the optimal single-item menu are given by:
= c0 (q )

and

(26)

c(q ) = v q ;

The …rst condition states that the quality is e¢ ciently supplied given that the (expected) valuation
of the buyer who buys the good is

. The second condition states that the threshold v is also

e¢ ciently chosen: given that q units are going to be supplied, it is e¢ cient to sell to a buyer with
valuation v if and only if the utility he obtains from this quality is larger than the cost of producing
it. We note that the second equality might eventually be satis…ed by some v < v, which means
there is no exclusion.
The reason there are no distortions in the quality supplied and the threshold is that in a singleitem mechanism there is zero buyer surplus. So these quantities are not distorted to reduce consumer
surplus. In general, when the optimal mechanism is a multi-item mechanism, both the thresholds
and the qualities provided are distorted to reduce the consumer surplus.

4.2

Single-item Menu Optimality

We say a distribution has modest tails if for all t 2 [0; 1] :
s
E[v 0 j F (v 0 )

t]

+2 1

1

1

t
F (v )

!

(

v ):

(MT)

The condition imposes an upper-bound on the conditional expected value of the tail of the distribution (i.e., values that are above some quantile t) based only on the threshold v and the conditional
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of the optimal single-item mechanism. Observe that the right hand side is equal to

when t = F (v ), and thus the inequality holds with equality. The left hand side and right hand side
are both increasing in t. Thus the condition requires that the conditional expected value of the tail
does not increase too fast. The right hand side equals 3
puts an upper bound on the support: v

2v when t = 1, and so the condition

2v : From a technical perspective, the condition

3

guarantees that the distribution is a mean-preserving contraction of an appropriately constructed
distribution that has linear density. We give our second main result and then provide additional
interpretation of (MT).
Theorem 2 (Optimality of Single-item Mechanisms)
If the distribution satis…es (MT) and c000 (q)

0, then the optimal mechanism is a single-item menu.

Theorem 2 shows that in a wide range of settings the optimal mechanism is a single-item menu.
Condition (MT) is stated in terms of v , which cannot be easily inferred from F without making
the explicit calculation. However, we can give stronger conditions that are easier to evaluate.
Distribution F satis…es (MT) if the density f is quasi-concave and it satis…es:1
f 0 (v) < 0 ) f 00 (v)

(QC)

0:

This condition states that f must be concave when it is decreasing. For example, any distribution
with (weakly) increasing density satis…es (QC).
We prove Theorem 2 as follows. We …rst show that when the cost is quadratic and the density
is linearly decreasing, the optimal mechanism is a single-item mechanism. We then show that the
optimal mechanism is a single-item mechanism when the marginal cost is convex and the density is
linearly decreasing. Finally, we show that the distributions (MT) are mean-preserving contractions
of an (appropriately constructed) linearly-decreasing density, which we use to prove that the optimal
mechanism is a single-item mechanism.

4.3

Linearly-decreasing Density and Quadratic Cost

We analyze the optimal mechanism when the distribution of values is given by:
L(v; v; v) ,
1

(v

v)(2v v
(v v)2

v)

:

(27)

In fact, (QC) alone implies quasi-concavity. We explicitly require quasi-concavity only to make the condition

more transparent.
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The density of this distribution, which we denote by l(v; v; v), is linearly-decreasing with zero density
at the top of the support:
l(v; v; v) = 0:
We begin by proving that a single-item mechanism is optimal when the cost is linear-quadratic:
c(q) , q +
The …xed cost

q2
+ :
2

(28)

plays no role in the analysis and is added to the cost function only to simplify the

exposition of some arguments.
Proposition 5 (Linear Density and Quadratic Cost Environment)
The optimal menu with linearly-decreasing density and a linear-quadratic cost function is always a
single-item menu.
Recall that in a …nite-item menu, the pro…ts can be written as in

Proof of Proposition 5.

(23). We consider the optimality conditions of the highest two intervals of an optimal mechanism.
For this, we de…ne the pro…ts from the highest two items:
K 1;K (vK 1 ;

qK 1 ; qK ) ,

(gK

1

+ gK ) qK 1 w K

+gK ( qK wK

c(qK

gK 1 c(qK

1
2

+

qK

1

+

2

+

(29)

qK 1 )

qK )) ;

which are the last two terms of the summations in (23). If the optimal mechanism is a multi-item
mechanism, the solution to the following problem:
K 1;K

=

max
vK

1

qK

must satisfy

qK 1 ;

2 [vK

qK > 0 and vK

K 1;K (vK 1 ;

(30)

q K 1 ; qK )

2 ; v];

1;

qK

0

2

< vK

1

< v, where qK

2

and vK

2

are parameters that are

kept …xed in the optimization problem.
Given the quadratic cost function, the optimality conditions for qK
qK
Hence,

1

= maxf

qK

1

wK

1

qK

2

(wK

wK 1 )gK
; 0g and
gK 1

1

qK =

and qK are:
wK

qK

1

:

(31)

> 0 only if
wK
wK 1

qK 2
gK 1 + gK
<
:
qK 2
gK

(32)
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To write expressions that are compact, we de…ne:
z,

v
v

vK
vK

1

,3

;

2

vK

qK

2

v

vK

Note that in an optimal mechanism we must have that
o¤ering a quality qK

2

2

:

2

0, as otherwise the mechanism would be

whose marginal cost is higher than the value for all values v 2 [vK 3 ; vK 2 ],

which is clearly suboptimal. Using these de…nitions, we have that (32) is satis…ed if and only if:
(3
(1

2z + )
1
< 2:
z
+ )

(33)

2z 2
1+z

And, for every z satisfying (33), (29) can be written as follows:
z

,

(gK

vK 2 )2
1 + gK )(v
18 (1 z 2 )

(3

4z 2
2z +
1+z

2z + )z 2 1

+ 1+

2z 2
1+z

2

!

:

(34)
Hence,

z

is equal to

K 1;K

when (32) is satis…ed. If the optimal mechanism is a multi-item

mechanism, there must exist z 2 [0; 1] satisfying (33) that maximizes (34).

If z maximizes (34) and satis…es (33) with strict inequality, then z must satisfy the …rst- and

second-order conditions. However, there is no z 2 [0; 1] that satis…es the …rst- and second-order

conditions:

@ z
@z

= 0 and
z=z

@2 z
@z 2

0:
z=z

Hence, there is no interior solution. This is a contradiction, so in the optimal mechanism

qK

1

= 0.

We now deploy the argument for the optimality of a single-item menu beyond the quadratic
model. Towards this end, we de…ne the solution to a restricted optimization problem for a linearquadratic cost function with parameters

and :

(v ( ; ); qK ( ; )) ,

arg max
0

q;vK

2

K 1;K (v; 0;

q);

(35)

v v

where we de…ne the optimal quantity for the last interval:
q K = q ( ; ) , qK

2

+

qK ( ; ):

Thus, we consider a restricted optimization problem where the seller takes as given the …rst K
2 intervals and allocations. The restricted problem (35) is then to …nd an interval (vK 1 ; v] =
(v ( ; ); v] and an allocation qK ( ; ) so as to maximize the pro…ts from all types in the given
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interval (vK 2 ; v]. This restricted maximization problem allows the interval (vK 1 ; v] to be a strict
inclusion of (vK 2 ; v]: that is, (vK 1 ; v] ( (vK 2 ; v]. In this case, all the types in the interval
(vK 2 ; vK 1 ] will receive the allocation qK 2 . Now, from Proposition 5, we know that:
K 1;K (vK 1 ;

for every

qK 1 ;

qK 1 ; qK ) <

K 1;K (v

( ; ); 0; qK ( ; ))

qK > 0. We add ( ; ) as an argument because we will eventually vary these

parameters; we don’t add

because the solution (v ( ; ); qK ( ; )) evidently does not depend

on the constant .

4.4

Linearly-decreasing Density and Convex Cost

We now analyze the entire class of convex cost functions with c000 (q)

0. We assume that the

optimal mechanism consists of multiple items and reach a contradiction. We denote by b
c(q) a

linear-quadratic cost function (as in (28)). We note that c(q) and b
c(q) intersect three times at most.
Furthermore, if c (q) and b
c(q) are equal at qualities q1 ; q2 ; q3 ; then the di¤erence b
c(q) c(q) satis…es:
b
c(q)

c(q)

0 () q 2 ( 1; q1 ] [ [q2 ; q3 ]:

We use this for the following result.
Lemma 5 (Dominating Cost Function)
For every convex cost function with c000 (q)

0 and for every (qK 2 ; qK 1 ; qK ) with qK

2

qK

1

qK , there exists ( ; ; ) satisfying c(qK 2 ) = b
c(qK 2 ) and one of the following three conditions:
1. c(qK ) = b
c(qK ); c(qK 1 ) = b
c(qK 1 ); c(q ( ; )) < b
c(q ( ; ));

2. c(qK ) > b
c(qK ); c(qK 1 ) = b
c(qK 1 ); c(q ( ; )) = b
c(q ( ; ));

3. c(qK ) = b
c(qK ); c(qK 1 ) > b
c(qK 1 ); c(q ( ; )) = b
c(q ( ; )).
Proof of Lemma 5. We begin by considering ; ;

chosen such that:

b
c(qK 2 ) = c(qK 2 ); b
c(qK 1 ) = c(qK 1 ); b
c(qK ) = c(qK ):

(36)
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For this, we need to set the parameters ; ;
=
=
=

2
c(qK ) qK

2

2(c(qK )(qK

1

c(qK )qK 1 qK

as follows:

2
2
2
2
2
qK
qK
qK
1 + c(qK 1 )(qK
2 ) + c(qK 2 ) qK 1
(qK qK 1 )(qK qK 2 )(qK 1 qK 2 )
qK 2 ) + c(qK 1 )(qK 2 qK ) + c(qK 2 )(qK qK 1 ))
(qK qK 1 )(qK qK 2 )(qK 1 qK 2 )
qK 2 ) + c(qK 1 )qK qK 2 (qK 2 qK ) + c(qK 2 )qK qK 1 (qK
2 (qK 1
(qK qK 1 )(qK qK 2 )(qK 1 qK 2 )

qK 1 )

These are the coe¢ cients one obtains from the interpolation of a second-degree polynomial.
Since b
c is a linear-quadratic cost function and since c000
c(q)

0, we have that for all q

qK 2 :

b
c(q) () q 2 [qK 1 ; qK ]:

(37)

In other words, b
c is equal to c at the qualities implemented by the mechanism and exhibits higher

costs at qualities that are in between these two qualities and lower cost outside this interval. If
q ( ; ) 2 [qK 1 ; qK ];

then we are in Case 1 of Lemma 5. We now show that, if q ( ; ) 62 [qK 1 ; qK ], then we can …nd
di¤erent ; ;

such that we are in Case 2 or 3 of Lemma 5.

Suppose that:
(38)

q ( ; ) < qK 1 ;

where ( ; ) satisfy (36). We then need to …nd di¤erent parameters ; . We consider parameters
;

as a function of q implicitly de…ned as follows:

We can write ; ;

b
c(qK 2 ) = c(qK 2 ); b
c(qK 1 ) = c(qK 1 ); b
c(q) = c(q):

explicitly as before but replacing c(qK ) with c(q) and qK with q. Since ;

are functions of q, we write

(q);

(q); (q) and observe that they are continuous functions of q

(while some of the denominators converge to 0 as q ! qK
q ( (qK ); (qK ))

;

1

the limits exist). We also have that:

qK < 0 and q ( (qK 2 ); (qK 2 ))

qK

2

0;

where the …rst inequality follows from (38) and the second inequality follows from the fact that q
by de…nition is larger than qK

2

exists a q^ 2 [qK 2 ; qK ] such that:

(see (35)) . Thus, following the intermediate value theorem, there
q ( (^
q ); (^
q )) = q^:

(39)
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Furthermore, note that qK > maxf^
q ; qK 1 g, so we have that b
c(qK ) < c(qK ). Thus, we are in Case 2
of Lemma 5.

Finally, if

q ( ; ) > qK ;
we can …nd

; ;

such that Case 3 is satis…ed in an analogous way to the case when (38) was

satis…ed. In particular, we consider parameters ;

as functions of q implicitly de…ned as follows:

b
c(qK 2 ) = c(qK 2 ); b
c(q) = c(q); b
c(qK ) = c(qK ):

And we can show there exists q^ such that q ( (^
q ); (^
q )) = q^ and:

c(qK ) = b
c(qK ); c(qK 1 ) > b
c(qK 1 ); c(q ( ; )) = b
c(q ( ; )):

This concludes the proof.

With this Lemma we can now extend the optimality result to convex cost functions.
Proposition 6 (Optimality of Single-item Menu with Linear Density and Convex Cost)
The optimal menu with linear decreasing density and c000

0 is always a single-item menu.

Proof of Proposition 6. We now suppose that the optimal mechanism satis…es

qK 1 ; qK >

0 and reach a contradiction. In the same manner as (29), we de…ne:
^K

1;K

(gK

1

,

+ gK ) qK 1 wK

gK 1b
c(qK

1

2

+

qK 1 ) + gK ( qK wK

b
c(qK

2

+

qK

1

+

qK )) :

Now c ( ) is the true cost function, which satis…ed c000 ( ) 0, and b
c ( ) is a linear-quadratic cost. So
^ K 1;K is computed as K 1;K but using the linear-quadratic cost instead of the true cost. With
a linear-quadratic cost the optimal mechanism is a single-item menu and thus:
^K

1;K (vK 1 ;

qK 1 ; qK ) < ^ K

1;K (vK 1 (

; ); 0; qK ( ; ))

We now consider the three cases in Lemma 5.
If we take ( ; ) so that the …rst case in Lemma 5 holds, then we have:
qK 1 ; q K ) = ^ K

1;K (vK 1 ;

; ); 0; qK ( ; )) > ^ K

1;K (vK 1 (

K 1;K (vK 1 ;
K 1;K (vK 1 (

qK 1 ; qK );

(40)

; ); 0; qK ( ; ));

(41)

Screening with Persuasion July 22, 2022

29

We thus have that:
K 1;K (vK 1 ;

qK 1 ; qK ) <

K 1;K (vK 1 (

; ); 0; qK ( ; ));

which contradicts the assumption that the multi-item mechanism is optimal.
If we consider ( ; ) that satisfy the cases 2 or 3 of Lemma 5, then the argument is analogous
but (41) will hold with equality and (40) will hold with strict inequality.

4.5

Distributions with Modest Tails

We now analyze distributions with modest tails. We begin with an important property of the
optimal single-item mechanism when the distribution has a linearly-decreasing density. For these
distributions, the …rst-order conditions (26) are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for optimality
when c000 ( )

0:

Proposition 7 (Su¢ cient Conditions for Optimality)
If c000 (q)

0, the distribution is L(v; v; v), and (^
q ; v^) satisfy the …rst-order condition (26), then

(^
q ; v^) solves (25), i.e. (^
q ; v^) = (q ; v ).
Proof of Proposition 7. When the distribution is linearly decreasing, we have that:
E[v j v

v^] =

2^
v+v
:
3

Hence, if (^
q ; v^) satisfy the …rst-order condition (26) we have that:
2^
v+v
= c0 (^
q)
3

and

We then have that:
v = 3c0 (^
q)

2

v^ =

c(^
q)
:
q^

c(^
q)
:
q^

We now note that,
d
(3c0 (q)
dq
If c000 (q)

0 we have that c00 (q)q

2

c(q)
2
) = (c00 (q)q
q
q

c0 (q) +

c0 (q). Hence, we have that:
d
(3c0 (q)
dq

2

c(q)
) > 0:
q

c(q)
) + c00 (q):
q
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Thus, there is a unique pair (^
v ; q^) such that the …rst-order condition is satis…ed.
We now verify that the …rst-order condition is su¢ cient for optimality. For this, we check
that the solution is always interior, and since there is only one point that satis…es the …rst-order
condition, this must be the optimum. We …rst note that q 2 f0; 1g is clearly never optimal. It
is also easy to see that v = v cannot be an optimum as then the objective function of (25) is 0.

We …nally note that v = 0 is never optimal, which can be checked by noting that the …rst-order
condition with respect to the cuto¤ gives c(q )

v q . Hence, the solution is always interior and it

must be the only point that satis…es the …rst-order conditions.
For a given distribution F , we now introduce two related distributions, one generated by a
linear decreasing density, and the other by a truncated version of the former. These latter two
distributions are constructed in such a way as to allow us to compare the pro…ts from the optimal
mechanism under F (which we do not know) to the optimal mechanism under these two related
distributions. Jointly with a cost-dominating argument, we can then establish the optimality of a
single-item menu in a large class of environments.
Towards this end, we consider a distribution L(v; z; z) with a linearly-decreasing density where
the lower and upper bounds of the distribution L, namely z; z, are chosen to satisfy the following
properties relative to the distribution F and the optimal single-item threshold v under F given by
(25):
L(v ; z; z) = F (v ) and EL [v j v

v ] = EF [v j v

v ];

(42)

where the subscripts in the expectation indicate the distribution used to compute the expectation.
Namely, at the threshold v , L and F obtain the same quantile, and the conditional expectation
above the threshold v are identical. To satisfy these conditions, it is necessary to set:
z =3EF [v j v

v ]

2v

z =3EF [v j v

v ]

2v .

3(EF [v j v v ] v )
p
;
1 F (v )

We also consider the following distribution F^ (v):
8
<L(^
v ; z; z); if v 2 [0; v^];
F^ (v) =
:L(v; z; z); if v 2 [^
v ; z];

where v^ is chosen such that:

Z

0

1

vdF (v) =

Z

0

1

vdF^ (v):

(43)
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In the proof of Lemma 6 we will show that indeed such a v^ exists. Thus, F^ (v) is constructed by
taking the mass of the lower tail of L(v; z; z) and moving it to 0. In other words, F^ is equal to
L(v; v; v) for v

v^, and F^ has an atom of size L(^
v ; z; z) at v = 0.

We can now relate these three distributions in terms of stochastic orders.
Lemma 6 (Distribution Comparison)
Distribution F^ is a mean-preserving spread of F and F^ is …rst-order stochastically dominated by
L(v; z; z).
Proof of Lemma 6. We …rst compare L(v; z; z) with F: Note that:
s
!
R1 1
L (v; z; v)dv
1 q
q
= +2 1
(
v );
1 q
1 F (v )
R1
F 1 (v)dv
q
=E[v j F (v) q]:
1 q
Hence, (MT) implies that for all v 0 2 [0; 1):
Z 1
F 1 (v)dv
F (v 0 )

Z

1

L 1 (v; z; v)dv:

(44)

F (v 0 )

If the inequality is satis…ed with equality for v 0 = 0, we have that v^ = z and, otherwise, v^ > z
(where v^ is used to construct F^ in (43)). Otherwise, we will have that v^ > z.
Since F^ is constructed by taking the mass of the lower tail of L(v; z; z) and moving it to 0, it is
transparent that F^ is …rst-order stochastically dominated by L(v; z; z). We have that (44) implies
that for all v 0

v^:

Z

1

F (v 0 )

F

1

(v)dv

Z

1

F^ (v)dv:

F (v 0 )

We also have that by construction F^ has the same mean as F . It then follows that for all v 0
Z 1
Z 1
1
F (v)dv
F^ (v)dv;
F (v 0 )

F (v 0 )

with equality for v 0 = 0: Hence, F^ is a mean-preserving spread of F (see Theorem 3.A.5 in Shaked
and Shanthikumar (2007)).
We can now conclude the proof by establishing the main result of this section, Theorem 2.
Final Step of the Proof of Theorem 2. We …rst verify that the optimal single-item mechanism when the distribution is L(v; z; z) is the same as when the distribution is F . By construction
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of L(v; z; z), the …rst-order condition that is satis…ed for F is also satis…ed for L(v; z; z). Following
Proposition 7, for the linearly decreasing density the …rst-order condition is su¢ cient for optimality,
and thus (v ; q ) given by (25) do in fact form the optimal mechanism for L.
We have that L(v; z; z) generates at least as much pro…t as F^ , and F^ generates at least as much
pro…t as F . Since the optimal mechanism for distribution L(v; z; z) is a single-item mechanism, and
this mechanisms generates the same pro…t (by construction) under distribution F , this must also
be the optimal mechanism under distribution F .

5

Additional Results

In this section we …rst analyze the optimal mechanism when the distribution has binary support and
the cost is iso-elastic. Under these assumptions we can fully characterize the optimal mechanism,
and the binary model will serve as a stepping stone to give more results about the general model.
Second, we show that if the distribution has narrow support the optimal mechanism is pooling.
We then show that, if the distribution has unbounded support, the optimal mechanism consists of
in…nitely many items. Finally, we o¤er the comparative statics of how the cost elasticity changes
the nature of the optimal mechanism.

5.1

Optimal Mechanism with Binary Values

Throughout this section, the values v of the buyer have binary support 0 < vL < vH , with probabilities fL and fH respectively (of course, fL + fH = 1). We also assume that the cost function is a
power function:
c(q) = q = ;
with

> 1.

The disclosure policy of the seller always contains two extremal policies: (i) the seller discloses
all information to the buyer and subsequently screens the di¤erent types through di¤erent qualities
the screening solution; or, (ii) the seller does not disclose any information and subsequently pools
all types and o¤ers a single item for sale the pooling solution.
In between these two extremal disclosure policies, there is a large number of intermediate policies
that would generate di¤erent optimal selling policies. The seller could combine low and high values
in arbitrary proportions to create many intermediate values, and thus additional values to screen
and to match with suitable qualities. Our …rst result is that the stochastic combination of low and
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high values will never be optimal. Either the values will be completely disclosed, thus yielding the
screening solution, or completely pooled, thus yielding the pooling solution.
Proposition 8 (Complete Screening or Complete Pooling)
The optimal mechanism either exhibits complete screening or complete pooling.
This result with binary values generalizes appropriately to a case of continuum values as stated
in Theorem 1. Namely, the optimal information is a monotone partition that pools adjacent values.
The set of pooled values may be small or large but is never formed through stochastic combinations.
With these two possible forms of optimal disclosure policies, it is only necessary to consider
three selling strategies: (a) with zero disclosure, the values are pooled and a single item is sold to
the expected value; (b) with complete disclosure sell only to the high value; and, (c) with complete
disclosure o¤er a menu that screens and serves distinct values. We notice that under either (a) or
(b), the optimal menu consists of a single item.
If the seller pools the values, the pro…t is:
P

, max f(fL vL + fH vH )q
q

c(q)g :

The buyer’s expected value is w = fL vL + fH vH and the seller provides the e¢ cient quantity qw
given the expected value and extracts the expected surplus.
If the seller serves the high value only, the pro…t is:
H

, max ffH (vH q

c(q))g ;

q

and the seller o¤ers a single-item qH at the e¢ cient level to the high value buyer. Relative to the
pooling solution, the pro…ts are higher when there is a sale, but the probability of a sale is lower.
If the seller o¤ers a menu (qL ; qH ), the pro…t is:
M

, max f(fH (vH qH
qL ;qH

c(qH )) + fL (qL vL

c(qL )))

fH qL (vH

vL )g:

Here the seller maximizes the di¤erence between the total surplus (…rst term) and the information
rents (second term). The high value buyer is o¤ered the e¢ cient quality qH while the low value is
o¤ered a quantity qL below the e¢ cient level to reduce the information rents.
Using the fact that we restrict attention to cost functions that are power functions, we can
determine the optimal quantities explicitly in the screening solution:
1
1

qL = vL (1

( vvHL

1)fH
fL

)

1

1
1

; and qH = vH 1 .

(45)
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If the optimal allocation is given by a single item, then the quality level is given by the e¢ cient
solution, thus either
qw = (fL vL + fH vH )

1

1
1

; or qH = vH 1 .

As a consequence, the pro…t function under either policy can be expressed explicitly as follows:
=vL

1

1

P

=vL

1

1

H

1

1

M

=vL

(fL + fH
fH (

vH
)
vL
(1
(1

vH
)
vL
1

(46)

;

1

(47)

;

fH vvHL )
fH )

1

1
1

!

vH
+ fH ( )
vL

1

!

:

We can now compare the revenue from the two disclosure policies: zero disclosure, and thus
complete disclosure, or max f

H;

M g.

(48)
P,

or

Toward a complete description of the optimal policy we …rst

observe that under complete disclosure the choice of the optimal menu”one or two items”depends
only on the values and frequencies, but not on the cost function for quality.
Lemma 7 (Screening with a One-item vs Two-item Menu)
With complete disclosure, a single-item menu yields higher pro…ts than a two-item menu if and only
if
vL < vH fH :

(49)

Lemma 7 provides a well-known trade-o¤ in screening problems. Serving the low value increases
e¢ ciency but it also increases the buyer’s information rents. Hence, the quality o¤ered to the low
value is distorted downwards. The distortion is increasing in the probability that the buyer has a
high value, and if this probability is too high, then the low value buyer is excluded completely and
o¤ered zero quality. Thus, we can express the optimality of the one-item versus two-item menus
in terms of the ratio of the values vH =vL and the probability fH (of the high value) alone. The
exclusion condition (49) in fact holds for all convex cost functions provided with a marginal cost of
zero at quality q = 0 (that is, c0 (0) = 0).
In contrast to the classic screening problem, we allow the seller to disclose less information and
in the limit pool the values of the buyers. The bene…t of pooling is that the seller can extract all
of the buyer’s expected surplus. The cost of pooling is that there are e¢ ciency losses associated to
providing the same quality to low and high values.

Screening with Persuasion July 22, 2022

35

We now characterize when pooling is used optimally. We de…ne a threshold ratio r that determines when pooling is optimal:
r(fH ; ) , fr 2 R+ j

P

maxf

H;

Mg

() vH =vL

rg:

(50)

In other words, r(fH ; ) is such that the optimal mechanism is pooling if and only if the ratio
between the high value and the low value, vH =vL

r(fH ; ), is below the threshold. The threshold

ratio r is a function of the primitives of the binary model, namely the prior probability fH of a high
value and the curvature of the cost function :
r : [0; 1]

R+ ! R+ :

We now characterize r.
Proposition 9 (Optimality of Pooling)
The correspondence r(fH ; ) as de…ned in (50) is not empty, it is single valued, and is increasing
in

and decreasing in fH , with r(1; ) = .
Propositions 7 and 9 jointly give us a complete description of the optimal mechanism. Figure

1 illustrates the qualitative properties of the optimal mechanism for di¤erent values of (fH ; vH ).
Figure 1 also illustrates how the optimal mechanism changes with the power
When

of the cost function.

= 2, an explicit expression for the threshold function r can be given:
8
p
<1 + p1 ; if fH > 3 5 ;
2
fH
r(fH ; 2) =
p
: fH2 3fH +3 ; if f
3
5
:
2
fH
fH +1

p
5)=2
The threshold level for fH is given by (3

H

(51)

2

0:38. Pooling is therefore optimal only when the

ratio between high and low value is su¢ ciently small. When the distribution gives more weight to
the high value, pooling becomes less bene…cial. We then see that o¤ering a multi-item mechanism
is optimal only when the probability of the high value is relatively small.
Corollary 2 (Single-item Menu)
p
If
2 and fH (3
5)=2, then the optimal mechanism is a single-item menu.
In this case, we can provide predictions about when it is optimal to o¤er a single-item menu based
on the distribution of the values and not the di¤erence between the values. This is because excluding
the low value is optimal when the di¤erence between values is high enough, or the probability of
the high value is high enough. We already solved analytically for the quadratic cost function, and
then we can extend the result to

> 2 by observing the r(fH ; ) is increasing in .
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Narrow Support Distributions

We can now show that, if the support of the distribution is narrow enough, the optimal mechanism
will necessarily be pooling. When the distribution has binary values, this follows as a direct corollary
of Proposition 9.
Corollary 3 (Small Di¤erences Between Valuations)
If the ratio between the high and low value is lower than

:

vH
< ;
vL
then the optimal mechanism pools both values.
We can extend the insight from the model with a binary value distribution to the general
environment with a continuum of values. We then replace the low and high value, vL and vH by
the lower and upper bound of the support of the distribution, thus v and v.
Proposition 10
Pooling is optimal for every distribution F with support in [v; v] if and only if
v
< :
v

(52)

Proof. Consider a distribution H with binary support in fv; vg such that the probability of v

is given by (

v

v)=(v

v) (where

v

is the mean of F ). We then have that H is a mean-preserving

spread of F . But, following Corollary 3, the optimal mechanism when the distribution is H pools
all values. Hence, this must also be the optimal mechanism when the distribution is F: This proves
the su¢ ciency part of the statement. The necessity part of the statement is straightforward because
if (52) is not satis…ed, then there is a binary value distribution with support in fv; vg for which

pooling is not the optimal mechanism.

To gain some intuition, we consider the case in which vH =vL

1 and analyze whether pooling

or o¤ering a two-item menu generates higher pro…ts (note that when vH =vL
vH =vL

1 we will have that

fH 1 so excluding the low value is not optimal). Of course, when vH =vL = 1, both selling

strategies are equivalent. With nearby values, it is su¢ cient to consider a …rst-order approximation.
Let SM and SP be the total surplus generated when o¤ering a two-item menu and single-item
menu that pools, and let

S be the di¤erence:
S , SM

SP :
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It is possible to verify that:
@ S
@vH

= 0:
vH =vL

In other words, at a …rst-order approximation the gains are 0 when the di¤erence in values is small.
As the cost is convex, small distortions around the socially optimal quantity generate only secondorder losses. Hence, o¤ering the optimal quantity for the low-value type to the high value type as
well generates second-order losses when the ratio between both values is close enough to 1.
On the other hand, when the values are pooled, the information rent of the buyer is UP = 0.
By contrast, the information rents when o¤ering a menu are:
UM = fH qL (vH

vL ):

The information rent is the surplus that the high value buyer obtains when reporting to be of
low value. The information rent is proportional to the di¤erence between values, and thus the
information rents increase linearly with vH .
We thus conclude that it is optimal to screen only when the ratio between the values is large
enough. The reason is that the e¢ ciency gains from a menu are convex in the di¤erence of the
values while the information rents are linear. Hence, it is pro…table to separate the high value only
when the high value is su¢ ciently high enough relative to the low value.
We note that the optimality of pooling has implications for social welfare as well. When pooling
is optimal and when the optimal mechanism with complete disclosure would exclude the low value,
then the pro…ts of the seller are higher under pooling. After all, the seller controls the amount of
information disclosed. Since the buyer receives zero information rent in either solution, it follows
that the social welfare also increases with pooling. With binary values, it further follows that
a buyer can never gain from the information policy of the seller, as pooling always removes any
residual information rent of the buyer. However, this result is special for the binary model, and
with more than two values, information control may increase the surplus of the buyer and the seller
simultaneously, and a fortiori increase the social surplus.2
2

For example, with three values, vL = 1=3; vM = 1=2; vL = 1, and probabilities fL = 2=3; fM = 1=6; fH = 1=6,

it can be shown that the optimal mechanism pools type vL and vM . In this mechanism the buyer’s surplus is larger
than under complete disclosure.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the Optimal Mechanism for Binary Distributions

5.3

Unbounded Support

So far we have assumed that the support of values is bounded. We have shown that the optimal
information structure is a …nite pooling information structure. We now examine what happens
when the distribution of values is unbounded.
Proposition 11 (Separation)
Suppose the support of values is unbounded (v = 1) and the cost is quadratic. Then, the optimal
mechanism consists of in…nite pooling intervals.

To prove this proposition, we use the same arguments as before to show that the optimal
information structure will consists of pooling intervals and that there are no accumulation points
in the intervals. When the distribution of values has …nite support this is enough to prove there
are …nite intervals. Instead, when the distribution of values is unbounded, we now show that there
must be in…nite intervals.
We assume that the optimal information structure consists of …nite pooling information structure, and reach a contradiction. To stay consistent with the notation previously introduced, the last
interval is [vK 1 ; 1). We consider an alternative mechanism in which we separate the last interval
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in [vK 1 ; 1) = [vK 1 ; v 0 ) [ [v 0 ; 1). The following de…nitions are useful:
gH ,

1
1

F (v 0 )
;
F (vK 1 )

gL ,

vH , E[v j v 2 [v 0 ; 1)];
qL ,

F (v 0 ) F (vK 1 )
;
1 F (vK 1 )

(53)

vL , E[v j v 2 [vK 1 ; v 0 ]];

qH ,

qK 1 ;

qK

1

+

(54)
(55)

qK :

We recall that the last two terms of the summation in (22) are written in (29), which corresponds
to the maximization of vK 1 ,

qK 1 ,

qK (while omitting the terms that do not depend on these

variables). When the cost is c(q) = q 2 , we can write the pro…t generated by the last two intervals
[vK 1 ; v 0 ); [v 0 ; 1) as follows:
K 1;K

,

arg max (gK + gK 1 ) (gH vH (qH
v 0 2 [vK 1 ; vK ]
qL ; qH

qL ) + qL vL

gH c(qH + qK 2 )

gL c(qL + qK 2 )) :

0

Hence we obtain a binary distribution model. We conclude with the following lemma.
Lemma 8 (Optimality Condition for the Two Highest Intervals)
Let vH , vL , and gH be de…ned as in (53)- (55) as a function of v 0 2 (vK 1 ; v). An optimal mechanism
that consists of a …nite number of pooling intervals must satisfy that for all v 0 , vH =vL

r(gH ):

However, when the distribution has unbounded support, one can separate a small enough tail
of the distribution, and thus it is better to separate the last two intervals than to pool them. This
is possible because by separating a small enough tail of the distribution one can generate a …nal
interval that has low enough probability, but whose expected value is high enough compared to the
previous intervals. For example, in Figure 2 we illustrate all the pair values of gH ; gL ; vH ; vL that
can be generated when a Pareto distribution is partitioned into only two intervals. We can clearly
see that if the partition is done at a high enough value, the distribution of values generated is such
that a two-item mechanism is better than pooling.

5.4

Comparative Statics with Respect to the Cost Elasticity

Consider some …xed information structure s that generates values w1 ; :::; wK each with probability
g1 ; :::; gK . We recall that the virtual values are:
k

= wk

(wk+1

wk )

1

Gk
gk

;
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Figure 2: Feasible Binary Distributions given Pareto Distribution of Values
where Gk =
k
1

Pk

i=1

gi and wK+1 = wK . Without loss of generality we assume that the virtual values

are strictly increasing (since any optimal information structure will satisfy this) and

2

> 0 (if

0, there is exclusion on the …rst interval).
We de…ne:
u(x) ,

8
<

1

x

1

:0

if x

0;

(56)

otherwise

If the cost is a power function c(q) = q = , the pro…ts generated by this information structure are:

M

=

K
X

gk u(

k ):

k=1

The pro…ts correspond to the expected utility that a risk-loving agent obtains when facing a lottery
that has payments equal to the virtual values f
by:

k gk2K :

u00 (x)x
=
u0 (x)

The relative risk aversion for x

1
1

;

so the hypothetical risk-loving agent is more risk loving as

is closer to 1. For comparison, the

pooling information structure generates pro…ts:
P

0 is given

= u( v ):

We can now compare the pro…ts generates by di¤erent information structures.
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Proposition 12 (Pro…t Comparisons as a Function of Cost Elasticity)
Consider some information structure s:
1. There exists
if

s

such that information structure s generates less pro…t than pooling if and only

s

such that information structure s generates less pro…t than complete disclosure

s.

2. There exists
if

s.

To prove this result, we …rst compare the pro…ts generated by some menu and by the pooling
information structure. For this, we note that:
X
gk k = w1 and

K

= wK :

K

>

k2K

We thus have that:

X

gk

k

<

v

and

v:

k2K

That is, the expected value of the virtual values is strictly less than the expected value, and
the highest realization of the virtual values is higher than the expected value of the true values.
Following the Arrow-Pratt characterization of risk aversion: a more risk-loving agent (lower )
always demands a lower certainty equivalent. Furthermore, in the limit

! 1 the agent becomes

risk-neutral, so pooling generates higher pro…t than s. We then conclude that there exists a unique
s

such that:
M

P

()

s:

This proves the …rst statement.
We denote by ^ the pro…ts generated by complete disclosure:
Z
^ = u(maxf (v); 0g)f (v)dv;
where

is de…ned in (11). We bound the ratio between the pro…ts generated by s and complete

disclosure as follows:
M

We note that

K

bM

=R

PK

gk u( k )
< R1
u( (v))f (v)dv
k=1

K

< v, so we have that:

Z

1
K

f (v)dv > 0:

1
u( (v))
f (v)dv
u( K )

:
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We thus have that:
lim

!1

M

bM

< lim R 1
!1

K

The limit is obtained from observing that when
so the integrand diverges to in…nity.

6

1
u( (v))
f (v)dv
u( K )

= 0:

! 1, the exponent in (56) converges to in…nity,

Discussion and Extensions

We stated our main results, Theorem 1 and 2, in the environment of nonlinear pricing …rst proposed
by Mussa and Rosen (1978). There, the buyer’s value is given by a multiplicatively separable
function of willingness-to-pay and quality and the seller’s cost of providing the quality is a general
increasing and convex cost of quality. The objective of this section is to describe how our two main
results extend to more general environments and determine which properties of the characterization
are speci…c to the environment described in Section 2.
Towards this end, we now consider a payo¤ environment where the buyer’s utility is nonlinear
in quality q and type v. In this nonlinear environment the variable v does not directly present the
value or (marginal) willingness-to-pay, and so we refer to v in this section as type v. We maintain
an increasing and convex cost function c (q) throughout:
u(v; q; p) , h(v; q)

p;

(57)

where h is a strictly increasing function and supermodular in both arguments v and q.
In the general nonlinear environment we show that the optimal menu will remain short. Theorem
3 establishes that there will be no intervals with complete disclosure about the type, small or larger.
However, Theorem 3 does not provide a comprehensive characterization of the optimal information
structure. In particular, in the general nonlinear environment, the optimal information structure
is not guaranteed to be a monotone partition in the type v anymore.3 In Example 1 we provide
an instance where the optimal information structure is a non-monotone partition. Finally, we show
that in the absence of supermodularity, the short menu result may disappear. Indeed, Example 2
gives an instance where complete disclosure is optimal.
3

In a sender-receiver setting di¤erent from ours, Candogan and Strack (2021) also note that the linearity is critical

in establishing a complete characterization of the optimal information structure.
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Nonlinear Marginal Utility

Suppose then that the utility function of the buyer is given by
u(v; q; p) , h(v; q)

p;

where the function h (v; q) permits a multiplicative separable representation
h (v; q) , hv (v) hq (q)
where hv (v) and hq (q) are continuous and strictly increasing functions: hv : [v; v] ! R+ and

hq : R+ ! R+ . The function hv (v) immediately suggests that we de…ne the value in terms of hv (v)

rather than v, and thus as long as hv is a monotone function, the function hv simply o¤ers a new
label for the types v without any further complication. Thus suppose we have
(58)

h(v; q) = vhq (q);

where hq (q) is a strictly increasing concave function. In this case, we can recover our original model
by de…ning:

and writing the cost in terms of qb:

qb , hq (q);

b
c(b
q ) , c(hq 1 (b
q )):

(59)

It is simple to verify that (given the assumptions we have made) b
c will also be convex. Hence,

we recover our original payo¤ environment by considering an appropriate change of variables. The
above transformations generalize the multiplicatively separable environment with a continuum of
types v and qualities q.
Maskin and Riley (1984) analyzed a model of nonlinear pricing with concave utility and constant
marginal cost. We can then ask how the su¢ cient conditions of Theorem 2 can be adapted to their
setting. Thus, we consider a model with non-linear utility
u(v; q; p) = vh(q)

p;

and constant marginal cost, c (q) = c q for some constant c
We recover the original model be de…ning:
qb = hq (q)

0.
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and cost c(b
q ) = h 1 (b
q ). The conditions of Theorem 2 then translate to this model as follows. First,
the modest-tail condition remains the same. This is because we just relabeled the quantities, which
of course, does not a¤ect how we de…ne values. Second, the condition requiring convex marginal
cost translates to:

@h(q) @ 3 h(q)
@q
@q 3

3

@ 2 h(q)
@q 2

2

A su¢ cient condition for this is that the marginal utility is concave (i.e., h has negative third
derivative).

6.2

Nonlinear Utility in Type and Quality

We now return to the nonlinear model introduced earlier in (57). We shall assume that h (v; q) is
twice di¤erentiable and given the supermodularity displays a positive cross-derivative. We assume
that the cross derivative is bounded away from 0. That is, for all v; q:
"<

@ 2 h(v; q)
1
< ;
@v@q
"

for some " > 0. For this nonlinear model, we can now establish that for any interval [v1 ; v2 ]

(60)
[v; v]

in the support of the type distribution F , complete disclosure of the type to the buyer cannot be
optimal. In consequence, the optimal information structure will always bundle types rather than
disclose them.
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Theorem 3 (Complete Disclosure is Never Optimal)
In every optimal mechanism, there is no interval [v1 ; v2 ] such that G (v) = F (v) for every v 2 [v1 ; v2 ]:
Proof of Theorem 3. We assume that G (v) = F (v) for every v 2 [v1 ; v2 ], for some interval

[v1 ; v2 ], and reach a contradiction. Following the same arguments as in Lemma 3, q must be strictly
increasing in this interval. To reduce the amount of notation we assume that the cost function is
identical to zero c(q) = 0 and that the buyer’s utility function is strictly concave in q; if the cost
is strictly increasing we can repeat the arguments by simply relabeling the buyer’s utility function
^ v) = h(q; v) c(q):
h(q;
The virtual surplus is given by:
(q; v) = h(v; q)

@h(v; q) 1 F (v)
:
@v
f (v)

For any increasing quality function q, the seller’s pro…ts are:
Z
(q(v); v)f (v)dv:

Analogous to the analysis in Section 3, we consider the pro…ts generated by a mechanism that pools
the allocation. The di¤erence between the optimal policy and the variation is given by:
Z v2
Z v2 R v2
(q (w); v)f (w)dw
v1
~ =
(q (v); v)f (v)dv
f (v)dv:
(F (v2 ) F (v1 ))
v1
v1

(61)

In other words, the values in [v1 ; v2 ] are randomly assigned some of the qualities that were allocated
in the optimal mechanism q (v):
We now prove that:
~
where

v

and

q

1
"

Z

v2

q (v)vf (v)dv

(F (v2 )

F (v1 ))

q v

;

(62)

v1

are de…ned as in (12) (so here

v

is the mean value in the interval [v1 ; v2 ]). For

this, we note that the function:

1
(q; v);
(v; q) , qv
"
is supermodular. This follows from calculating the cross-derivative and using that the cross derivative of

is less than 1=" (see (60)). Since q (v) is increasing, when (w; v) are independently

distributed according to F we have that (q (w); v)

P DQ

(q (v); v), where the subscript PQD de-

notes the Positive Quadrant Dependence order (see Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) Chapter 9).
We then have that:
Z v2 Z v2
1
F (v2 ) F (v1 ) v1 v1

(v; q (w))f (v)f (w)dvdw

Z

v2

v1

(v; q (v))f (v)dv:
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which corresponds to (9.A.17) in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007). Replacing the de…nition of
(v; q) and replacing (61), we obtain (62).
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, as in (15), and following the same steps as before, we
obtain that:

~

v)
1 dq (^
f (^
v ):
(63)
!0
" dv
Note that the right-hand-side of (62) is the same as the right-hand-side of (14) except for the fact
lim

3

that the cost does not appear (which is not necessary for the argument) and instead of
v. This is the reason the derivative of

we have

does not appear in (63), while it does appear in (16). As

before, we conclude that the e¢ ciency losses are of order

3

.

We now consider the following policy (17). We additionally change the information structure
so that all types in (v1 ; v2 ) are pooled, that is, the information structure is (17). Observe that the
^ and by (~
total surplus generated by (^
q ; G)
q ; G) is the same. Then, the di¤erence in the generated
pro…ts is equal to the di¤erence in the expected buyer surplus. We then have that:
!
R v2
h(v;
)
h(v;
q
(v
))
f
(v)dv
1
q
v
1
^ ~ =(1 F (v1 ))
h(v1 ; q ) h(v1 ; q (v1 ))
(F (v2 ) F (v1 ))
Z v2 Z v Z q
(1 F (v1 ))
@ 2 h(y; q (z))
=
dzdyf (v)dv
(F (v2 ) F (v1 ))
@v@q
v1
v1 q (v1 )
"(

q

q (v1 ))(

v

v1 )(1

F (v1 )):

As in Section 3, we can then conclude that:
^
lim

!0

Here we used that (
2

v

v1 )= !1, as

. We thus conclude that for

~
2

"

dq (^
v)
(1
dv

F (v1 )):

! 0: We thus have that the e¢ ciency losses are of order

small enough, the new policy generates higher pro…ts.

The implications of Theorem 3 for the optimal information structure are notably weaker than the
characterization o¤ered in Theorem 1. In particular, we do not claim that the optimal information
structure is given by a partition that is monotone and …nite. The main implication of Theorem 1 is
that with the above assumptions on supermodularity and di¤erentiability there will be no complete
disclosure of types anywhere. However, the pooling of types may be stochastic or not monotone in
the type v. Thus the optimal menu will be coarse in the sense that some values in the distribution
F will not appear in the support of the distribution G.
With weaker conditions on the di¤erentiability and supermodularity than given by (60), the
result of Theorem 1 may fail as the next example illustrates.
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Example 1 (Weak Supermodularity) Suppose the buyer has the following preferences:
u(v; q; p) = minfq; vg

p;

(64)

and the marginal cost of production of quality is normalized to zero. The buyer therefore has a
marginal value of quality equal to 1 until the quality reaches the level of their type v. Thus, higher
types have higher demand for quality. We claim that in this setting the seller can extract the full
surplus by o¤ering a menu to the buyer that o¤ers any level of quality at a per unit price of 1.
In this example, the optimal mechanism o¤ers complete disclosure of values and a continuum of
qualities. Here, the marginal gains from higher quality or higher types are not bounded away from
zero (and the utility function is not di¤erentiable everywhere) in contrast to the above condition
(60). In fact we have that
@ 2 h(v; q)
= 0;
@q@v
for almost every value-quality pair, which allows for full surplus extraction. Thus, we might consider
the above example as a knife-edge case.
Indeed, the next example strengthens the supermodularity condition. It will lead to an optimal
information structure that is a partition. However, the partition is not monotone anymore and the
optimal partition combines non-adjacent types.
Example 2 (Variation of Weak Supermodularity) Suppose there are three values vL ; vM ; vH .
The low and medium type have demand k < 1 with marginal values of 1 and 2, while the high type
has unit demand with marginal value of 3:
u (vL ; q) = minfq; kg;
u (vM ; q) = 2 minfq; kg;
u (vH ; q) = 3 minfq; 1g:
The production cost is:
c(q) =

8
<0

: 1 (q
2

if q

k;

k) if q

k:

We denote by fL ; fM ; fH the probability of each type and for the computations assume that fL = fH
and fL ; fH < fM with fL < 1=6.
We claim that the optimal mechanism is to pool the low and the high types while separating the
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medium type. First we observe that if the three types were pooled, then only k units are sold at
a price of 2 per unit (i.e., thus a payment of p = 2k). Second, if the high type and the low type
are pooled, then k units are sold at price a price of 2k to the medium type and 1 unit at a price
2k + 3(1

k)=2 to the pooled type. These two observations allow us to conclude that pooling the

three types is dominated by pooling the high and low type and separating the medium type. By
contrast, separating the three types is dominated by pooling the low and medium type. Moreover, if
k is su¢ ciently close to 1, then pooling the three types is better than pooling the low and medium
and separating the high type. We can therefore conclude that the above non-monotone pooling can
be optimal.4
In this second example, the supermodularity was strengthened as higher types have a higher
marginal value for quality. Yet, without strictly increasing preferences for more quality everywhere, we showed that a non-monotone partitions arises as an optimal information structure. Thus,
monotonicity and supermodularity appear as important conditions for the optimality of monotone
partitions.

7

Conclusion

In the digital economy, the sellers and the digital intermediaries working on their behalf frequently
have a substantial amount of information about the quality of the match between their products,
the taste of the buyers, and ultimately the buyers’preferences. Motivated by this, we considered a
canonical nonlinear pricing problem that gave the seller control over the disclosure of information
regarding the value of the buyer for the products o¤ered.
We showed that in the presence of information and mechanism design, the seller o¤ers a menu
with only a small variety of items thus, a coarse menu. In considering the optimal size of the menu,
the seller balances con‡icting considerations of e¢ ciency and surplus extraction. The socially
optimal menu would provide a menu with a continuum of items to perfectly match quality and
taste. By contrast, the pro…t-maximizing seller seeks to limit the information rent of the buyer by
narrowing the choice to a few items on the menu. We provided su¢ cient conditions for a broad
class of distributions where this logic led the seller to o¤er only a single item on the menu. While
4

This non-monotone partition is an example of a laminar partitional information structure as de…ned in Candogan

and Strack (2021). Namely, the convex hulls of any two partition elements are such that either one contains the
other or they have an empty intersection.
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we obtained our results in the model of nonlinear pricing pioneered by Mussa and Rosen (1978), we
showed that the coarse menu result remained a robust property in a larger class of nonlinear payo¤
environments.
In our analysis, the seller chooses the level of quality endogenously to match the expected taste
of the buyer. In related work, McAfee (2002) matches two given distributions of, say, consumer
demand and electricity supply, and shows how coarse matching by pooling adjacent levels of demand
and supply can approximate the socially optimal allocation. In this analysis, a range of di¤erent
products are o¤ered in the same class and with the same price. From the perspective of the buyer,
the product o¤ered is therefore opaque, as its exact properties are not known to the buyer who
is only guaranteed certain distributional properties of the product. This practice is sometimes
referred to as opaque pricing, see Jiang (2007) and Shapiro and Shi (2008) for applications to
services and transportation and Bergemann, Heumann, Morris, Sorokin, and Winter (2022) for
auctions. Our analysis regarding the optimality of coarse menus would equally apply if we were to
take the distribution of qualities as given and merely determine the partition of the distribution
of the qualities. The novelty in our analysis is that the seller renders the preferences of the buyer
opaque to …nd the optimal trade-o¤ between e¢ cient matching of quality and taste against the
revenues from surplus extraction.
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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 8. We can write (7) as follows:
=

Z

Z

v

wq(w)

c(q(w))

v

w

q(t)dt dG(w):

v

The maximization over G (…xing q) corresponds to a classic Bayesian persuasion problem. When F
has binary support, there exists an optimal information structure with binary support (see Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011)).
We then have that the distribution of expected values will have support in fwL ; wH g and the

probabilities will be gL ; gH satisfying:

gL wL + gH wH = fL vL + fH vH :
Thus, the optimal mechanism will be either pooling, a two-item mechanism, or a single-item mechanism in which the low type is excluded. The pro…ts are given by (??)-(46), but replacing fH ; vH ; vL
with gH ; wH ; wL . To make the notation more compact, we de…ne:
,
Clearly, if

2 (1; 1),

1

(65)

:

2 (1; 1). Hence, we analyze this range of parameters.

We now compute the derivatives respect to gH keeping wL …xed (hence, adjust wH so that the
mean of expected valuations remains constant). For the second derivative, we have that:
@2 M (
=
2
@gH
@2 H (
=
2
@gH

3
(1
wL )2 gH

1) (wH
1) gH

1

(vH
2
vH

gH )
gH
vL )2 (gH vH )

1

(wL

gH wH )

2

+ wH

2

> 0;

>0

Hence, we will always have that in the optimum gH = fH or gH 2 f0; 1g: We can then also conclude
that, if the mechanism o¤ers one item with exclusion, then we must have that wL = vL . So, if the

mechanism o¤ers one-item with exclusion we must have full disclosure. We now show that, if the
optimal mechanism o¤ers two items, we must have that wL = vL :
We now compute the derivative of

M

with respect to gH keeping wH = vH …xed (hence, adjust

wL so that the mean of expected valuations remains constant). The …rst and second derivative are
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given by:
@ P
=vH
@gH
@ 2 P 2 (vH
=
2
@gH

wL
1

wL ) (wL

We …rst observe that

Furthermore, @

P =@gH

1

gH vH
gH

(2

1)(vH
2

gH vH )

wL ) + (1
1 gH

(1 gH ) ((2
(1 gH ) +1

@ P
jw =v = 0 and
@gH L H

gH )vH

1)(vH

;

wL )

(1

gH )vH )

:

@ P
jw =g v = vH :
@gH L H H

= 0 is convex in wL and
@ @ P
j
v (2(
@wL @gH wL = H 2

1)+gH )
1

So, the …rst-order condition must be satis…ed by some wL <
we have that

@2 P
2
@gH

vH (2(
2

vH (2(
(2

0 () wL

= 0:
1)+gH )
:
1

From the second derivate,

1) + gH )
:
1)

Thus, the …rst- and second-order condition are never satis…ed. We thus reach a contradiction, so
wL > vL is never optimal.
Proof of Proposition 9.

Recall that the pro…ts of the three strategies are given by (??)-

(46). Hence, the comparisons between selling strategies will only depend on vH =vL . Thus, for the
calculations, we can simply normalize vL = 1.
We …rst note that, for any (fH ; vH ) such that fH vH
H

1

() vH

P

1,
fH
1

fH

:

fH

We thus get the following lemma.
Lemma 9 (Pooling vs Serving Only High Type)
For all (fH ; vH ) such that gH vH

1, it is optimal to pool types if and only if
1

vH

fH
1

fH

:

fH

We denote by f~H the solution to:
f~H

1
f~H

1

f~H

,

1
:
f~H

(66)
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We thus get that:

1

v^(fH ; ) =

fH

fH

f~H .

, for all fH

1

fH

In this segment v^(fH ; ) is decreasing in fH and increasing in : Note that when vH = 1=fH , we
have M = H . Hence, v^(fH ; ) will be continuous at f~H .
We now continue to analyze v^(fH ; ) in the segment vH < 1=f~H : We de…ne:
~,

P:

M

Calculating the derivatives, we get:
~ jv =1 = 0;
H
@~
jv =1 = fH < 0;
@vH H
@2 ~
=(
1) fH fH (1
2
@vH
where

(67)
(68)
fH )1

(1

fH vH )

2

fH (fH (vH

1) + 1)

is de…ned in (65). The last inequality can be veri…ed as follows. If
(1

On the other hand, if

fH )1

(1

fH vH )

2

> 1 and (fH (vH

1) + 1)

2

2

+ vH

2

> 0;

(69)

< 2, then:
< 1:

> 2, then
(fH (vH

1) + 1) < vH :

Hence, in either case ~ is convex with respect to vH : We have that (67)-(69) implies that: (a) there
exists a unique threshold vH at which M generates higher pro…ts than P (hence con…rming that
v^(fH ; ) exists also for fH f~H ), and (b) we have that, for vH such that ~ = 0, we must have that
@ ~ =@vH > 0.
We now show that v^(fH ; ) is decreasing in

(in the segment fH

theorem states that:
@^
v (fH ; )
=
@

@~
@
@~
@vH

f~H ). The implicit function

:

We already proved the denominator will be negative, so we now prove that the numerator is negative.
Hence, we prove that, for any (fH ; vH ) such that ~ = 0; the numerator is also negative.
We de…ne:

0

~ 0 , log @

(1 fH vH )
(1 fH ) 1

+ fH vH

(fL + fH vH )

1

A:
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This is a monotonic transformation of ~ , which will help get more compact expressions. We now
check that:
@2 ~ 0
fH (1
=
2
@

fH )

+1

vH (1 fH vH ) ( log(1
(fH (1 fH ) vH (fH

fH vH ) + log(1 fH ) + log(vH ))2
>0
1)(1 fH vH ) )2

That is, ~ 0 is convex in , and we note that:
~0 j

=1 =

log(1

fH + fH vH ) < 0;

lim ~ 0 = 1 > 0:
!1

Thus, ~ 0 = 0 for one

2 (1; 1), and ~ 0 is increasing in whenever ~ 0 = 0: We can then conclude
that there exists a unique 2 (1; 1) such that ~ = 0, and ~ is increasing in whenever ~ = 0,

and thus decreasing in : Hence, following the implicit function theorem, v^(fH ; ) is increasing in :
We now show that v^(fH ; ) is decreasing in fH (in the segment fH
f~H ). We prove this
separately for the case

2 and

> 2: We prove the case

2 by appealing to the implicit

function theorem. We note that:
~ jf =0 =0
H
~
@
jf =0 =vH
@fH H
@2 ~
=(
@fH2

2 (vH
1) (vH

1)
1)

1
2

(1 fH vH ) 2
(1 fH ) +1

In this case, we can sign the last term when

(fH (vH

1) + 1)

2

> 0:

< 2, then:

(1 fH vH ) 2
> 1 and (fH (vH
(1 fH ) +1

1) + 1)

2

< 1:

@~
Hence, for a …xed vH , there exists fH such that ~ = 0 only if @f
jfH =0 > 0. And we then have that
H
~
@
~ = 0 implies that
> 0. Following the implicit function theorem, v^(fH ; ) is decreasing in fH .
@fH

We now prove that v^(gH ; ) is decreasing also for

> 2. For this, we de…ne:

qP , (gL vL + gH vH )

1
1

;

which is the quality sold in the pooling mechanism. Using the envelope theorem, we have that:
@~
= vH (qH
@gH

qL )

(c(qH ) + c(qL ))

(vH

vL )qP ;
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where qH and qL are de…ned in (45). The objective function of
any point such that ~ = 0, we have that,

and

M

is linear in gH . So, at

P

@~
>0
@gH
if and only if
qL v L

c(qL )

(qP vL

(70)

c(qP )) < 0:

The left-hand-side of the inequality is the di¤erence between the intercept of
prove that (70) is satis…ed at any point such that ~ = 0 when
2:

M

and

P.

We now

We begin by noting that:
1 = arg max qvL

c(q):

q2R

We also note that qL < 1 < qP and the objective function is concave. To make the notation more
compact, we de…ne:
, fH (vH
and note that qP = (1 + )1=(

1)

vL )

. We also note that:
(vH

qL = (vL

vL )fH
fL

)

1

< (1

1

)

1

< 1:

1

So, we have that:
qL vL

c(qL )

(qP vL

c(qP )) < (1

1

)

1

vL

(1

)

1

((1 + )

1
1

vL

(1 + )

1

):

We now show that the right-hand-side is less than 0. For this, we write this term as a ratio and
note that:
(1

1

)

(1 + )
and
@
@

(1

)

1
1

vL

(1

)

1

vL

(1

)

1

1

vL

(1 + )

1

1

1

!

=0 =

1

2) (1
)
(
1)(

1
1

1

( + 1)
+ 1)2

1

< 0:
(1 + ) 1 vL (1 + ) 1
To check the inequality it is useful to recall that we are analyzing the range fH vH < vL , and so
< 1. Hence, for all

1

=

2 2(

j

> 0,
(1

)

(1 + )

1
1

vL

(1

)

1

1

vL

(1 + )

1

1

< 1:

This proves that
qL v L
which concludes the proof.

c(qL )

(qP vL

c(qP )) < 0;
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